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The District Court Erred By Concluding That Aberasturi’s Detention Was 
Unreasonably Extended 
 
A. The District Court Clearly Erred By Determining That Aberasturi’s 
Detention Was Prolonged Beyond The Original Investigation, Because 
Before Aberasturi Was Told To “Sit Tight” A Second Time, Officer Viens 
Had Already Been Notified That The K-9 Had Alerted On Aberasturi’s 
Vehicle 
 
 The primary issue on appeal is a question of timing: whether the K-9 alert 
happened before, or after, the officer’s continued detention of Aberasturi with an 
instruction to “sit tight.”  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-14.)  Aberasturi appears to 
agree with this framing of the issue, as she states that “the time of the dog alert” 
is the “determining factor in this case” and the “decisive finding.”  (Respondent’s 
brief, pp. 12-13.)  Application of the law to the evidence shows the district court’s 
factual finding that the dog alert was not shown to precede the extension of the 
detention is clearly erroneous. 
 The burden of proof “for all suppression issues” is a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.  See State v. Harris, 130 Idaho 444, 447, 942 P.2d 568, 571 
(Ct. App. 1997).  Where the district court below determines “that a party has 
failed in its burden of proof,” this Court will accept those findings, so long as they 
are not clearly erroneous.  State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Roe, 139 Idaho 
18, 21, 72 P.3d 858, 861 (2003).  “Under the restrained standard of clear error 
customarily applied to factual issues, a factual finding will not be deemed clearly 
erroneous unless, after reviewing the entire record, an appellate court is left with 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”  Id.  Factual 
“[f]indings will not be deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by 
 2 
substantial evidence in the record.”  State v. Lutton, No. 43257, 2017 WL 
192846, at *4 (Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017) (citing State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 
137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App 2006)). 
 Here, the district court clearly erred by finding the timing of the K-9 alert 
could not be determined.  The record does not reveal substantial evidence that 
supports the district court’s factual findings on this issue.  Rather, the evidence, 
found in the transcript, shows that the alert happened before the extended 
detention.  Because Aberasturi’s statement of the facts omits the decisive 
portions of the transcript, they are worth repeating here again.  Officer Plaisted 
testified that: 
 Q. Okay. And so what does Geno [the K-9] do at that time? 
A. So he’s—he’s sat down. He’s alerted to the car. I now have 
probable cause to search this car. 
 
I open up the passenger door. He immediately flies into the car, 
goes right to the center console area of the vehicle, again starts 
sniffing around the center console…. 
 
Q. Okay. And so after he does that, what do you do next? 
 
A. I pull him out of the car, I lifted up the center console, looked in, 
and saw a package of Marlboro cigarettes. And I opened that 
up, looked in, and I believe I saw a plastic baggie with some 
white powder in it which I believed to be methamphetamine at 
that point. I, then, left the car, shut the door to go put my 
dog back in the car, in my patrol car, and notified Officer 
Viens of the alert and specific areas that we needed to 
search. 
 
(Tr., p. 71, L. 20 – p. 73, L. 1 (emphasis added).)  
 





Q. —and he showed interest in the center console and so then you 
searched and found that, did you at this time search the entirety of 
the car? 
 
A. No, ma’am. 
 
Q. Okay. That’s when you closed the door, put the dog back, 
and then alerted Officer Viens? 
 
A. Yes, ma’am. 
 
(Tr., p. 73, Ls. 8-18 (emphasis added).)  Officer Viens correspondingly testified 
that the post-alert notification happened while he was still discussing disorderly 
conduct with Aberasturi: 
Q. Okay. And while you’re having this discussion with her 
about the disorderly conduct violation, does Officer Plaisted 




Q. And what is that for? 
 
A. To let me know that his dog alerted on the vehicle. 
(Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25 (emphasis added).)  Taken together, the officers’ testimony 
is consistent and unmistakable: the alert occurred prior to the end of Viens’ 
conversation with Aberasturi, and therefore prior to the second “sit tight.” 
 By contrast, Aberasturi’s summary of the facts simply states that “[t]he 
district court found the dog alerted after Officer Viens concluded his disorderly 
conduct investigation.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 4.)  However, in addition to being 
an incorrect characterization of the district court’s finding,1 this statement of fact 
                                            
1 The district court did not find that “the dog alerted after Officer Viens concluded 
his disorderly conduct investigation.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 4; see R., pp. 121-
32.)  As previously mentioned in the state’s briefing, the district court found that 
“[whether [the officer-to-officer notification] occurred as Geno was showing 
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lacks any citation to the transcript that would support it.  (See Respondent’s brief, 
p. 4.)  In any event, substantial evidence does not support the district court’s 
finding on this point: that “the exact time” of the alert “cannot be determined.”  
(R., pp. 129-30.)  Because the evidence in the record shows that the alert 
happened prior to the instruction to “sit tight,” the district court clearly erred in 
determining otherwise. 
Aberasturi takes several approaches to overcoming the officers’ plain 
testimony regarding the timing of the alert.  She begins by characterizing the 
state’s recitation of facts on this issue, which cites directly to the officers’ 
testimony above, as “contrary to the district court’s findings.”  (Respondent’s 
brief, p. 4.)  But that is precisely the state’s point: the officers’ testimony, which is 
the only direct evidence on the question, indeed contradicts the district court’s 
findings.  The officers gave crystal-clear testimony that the alert happened 
before the officer-to-officer notification, and before the conversation with 
Aberasturi regarding disorderly conduct concluded.  (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25; p. 71, 
L. 20 - p. 73, Ls. 18.)   Nevertheless, the district court found it could not 
determine when the alert happened.  (R., pp. 129-30.)  Because the state is 
arguing that in light of the evidence, the court clearly erred, it is no surprise that a 
statement of fact based on the hearing transcript would be contrary to the district 
                                                                                                                                  
interest in the window or after he sat and refused to move is unknown,” and that 
“there is no indication in the recording by Hoffman that this occurred before the 
reason for the stop was concluded.”  (R., p. 130 (emphasis added).)  Likewise, 
the district court found that “[s]omewhere between” the start of Plaisted’s 
conversation with Aberasturi and the time of arrest, “Geno alerted to the 
presence of narcotics in Defendant’s car,” but “[t]he difficulty for the State is that 
the exact time cannot be determined.”  (R., pp. 129-30 (emphasis added).) 
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court’s findings.  But simply pointing this out does not meaningfully address, let 
alone rebut, the state’s argument. 
Second, Aberasturi adopts the district court’s finding “that the court is not 
confident all of the minor details of the incident are remembered exactly as they 
happened or in the order they happened.”  (R., p. 130.)  Aberasturi takes this 
premise to its limit, arguing that “the officers’ testimony was inconsistent and 
unreliable,” and concluding that, “as found by the district court, Officer Viens’s 
and Officer Hoffman’s[2] testimony provides no guidance on the time of the dog 
alert.”  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 13-15.) 
These  contentions—that the officers’ testimonies are inconsistent and 
give “no guidance”—miss the mark.  These arguments fail because Aberasturi 
has not pointed out any inconsistency in the officers’ testimony regarding the 
timing of the alert.  (See Respondent’s brief, p. 13 (vaguely alluding to “conflicts 
in the officers’ testimony” but not actually stating what those conflicts, if any, 
were).)  The same can be said of the district court, which supported its finding 
with just one example of a “discrepancy”: 
For example, Officer Viens testified that his conversation with 
Officer Plaisted took place between the time he ran the names and 
his conversation with Defendant explaining her need to get 
permission from the dumpster owners. Officer Plaisted testified the 
conversation took place while Officer Viens was in his patrol 
vehicle. 
 
(R., p. 130, n.6.)   
                                            
2 This appears to be intended to refer to Officer Plaisted.  Officer Hoffman did 
not testify below.  (See Tr.) 
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This example fails to show that the officers’ testimony regarding the alert 
was inconsistent, or that the officers were not credible on this point.  In fact, this 
example only tends to show another erroneous factual finding, because Officer 
Viens did not testify that his conversation with Officer Plaisted occurred 
sometime between running the information and returning to Aberasturi.  In 
actuality, Officer Viens testified that the overheard conversation between Officer 
Plaisted and Aberasturi occurred at this time.  (Tr., p. 41, L. 9 – p. 42, L.12.)3  
Thus, the court’s single example fails to show that any officer testimony was 
inconsistent, let alone show that the crucial testimony regarding the alert was 
inconsistent.  As a result, to the extent the court made a finding that the officers’ 
testimony regarding the alert was inconsistent, the evidence in the record does 
not support it.  The state submits that this Court can itself judge whether the 
officers’ testimony was consistent, and further submits that Aberasturi has failed 
to show that the decisive testimony on the timing of the alert was inconsistent.4 
                                            
3 And note that this account would be entirely consistent with Officer Plaisted’s 
recollection:  Officer Plaisted testified that when he arrived on scene, he believed 
“Officer Viens was sitting in his patrol car doing some kind of records check on 
the individuals he was with.”  (Tr., p. 67, Ls. 18-20.)  While he cautioned that he 
could not remember whether he initially spoke to Viens before speaking to 
Aberasturi, he nevertheless stated that “Viens was in his patrol car, again, doing 
records checks. I pulled [Aberasturi] aside from Hoffman’s car over to Viens’ car. 
I briefly spoke to her.”  (Tr., p. 68, Ls. 20-23.)  Likewise, Officer Viens recalled 
that Officer Plaisted arrived when he was in his patrol car running information, 
and that the Aberasturi-Plaisted talk happened sometime after Officer Viens 
finished running the information, but before he went back to Aberasturi.  (Tr., p. 
42, Ls. 5-12; p. 52, Ls. 4-11.) 
 
4 Aberasturi takes issue with this Court even reviewing inconsistency findings, 
lumping it in with improper invitations to “assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences.”  
(Respondent’s brief, p. 13 (citing State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570, 328 P.3d 
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Aberasturi appears to argue that because Plaisted notified Viens of the 
“specific areas” to be searched, that the officer-to-officer notification must have 
been verbal.  (See Respondent’s brief, pp. 14-15.)  Because no such verbal 
notification can be heard on the audio, Aberasturi infers that “the district court 
correctly found Officer [Plaisted] made some kind of ‘hand signal or gesture’ to 
inform Officer Viens ‘that something was going on with the dog and the vehicle,’” 
and that thus, “when Officer Viens told Ms. Aberasturi to ‘sit tight’ a second time, 
it was likely only in response to the dog’s ‘head snap’ and ‘bracketing.’”  
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 14-15; see also Defense Exhibit 1.)  Combining this 
assumption with the balance of the testimony, it seems that Aberasturi is arguing 
there were two distinct officer-to-officer notifications—one non-verbal, notifying 
Viens of the pre-alert activity, and one verbal, notifying Viens of the alert and 
where to search.  (See Respondent’s brief, pp. 14-15.) 
 The  evidence does not support such a claim.  While the district court 
drew a reasonable inference that the officer-to-officer notification was done by 
hand signal (R., p. 130), that finding does not compel a conclusion that there 
was a separate verbal notification, simply because Officer Plaisted “notified 
Officer Viens of the alert and specific areas that we needed to search.”  (Tr., p. 
                                                                                                                                  
548, 550 (Ct. App. 2014)).) However, this Court can resolve whether the 
testimony was consistent without invading any province of the district court. The 
transcript of the testimony is either self-evidently consistent, or it is not. By 
definition, judging textual consistency requires no credibility assessment, conflict 
resolution, evidence weighing, or other inferential judgment calls.  To the extent 
the testimony about the alert is consistent on its face, it speaks for itself. 
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72, L. 24 – 73, L. 1.)  If one can conclude, as the court reasonably did,5  that a 
non-verbal gesture could have notified Officer Viens that the K-9 alerted, one 
can also easily imagine the same gesture pointing out where the K-9 alerted.  In 
any event, the district court did not find that there was more than one notification, 
and did not find that the officer-to-officer notification happened after the 
instruction to “sit tight”; nor did Officer Plaisted testify that notification was verbal, 
or that it came after that instruction.  (See R., pp. 129-30; Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25; p. 
73, Ls. 8-18.)  Aberasturi’s challenge to the testimony accordingly fails. 
Lastly, Aberasturi suggests that “if any inferences are drawn from the 
record, the evidence on the dog sniff supports the opposite finding—that the 
police prolonged Ms. Aberasturi’s detention to continue the dog sniff after the 
purpose of the stop was fulfilled.”  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 15-16.)  She argues 
that Officer Viens “fulfilled the purpose of the seizure” somewhere around 11:27 
to 11:34 in the audio of the stop.  (Respondent’s brief, p. 15.)  The state submits 
that while the audio exhibit is at times difficult to hear, it shows the disorderly 
conduct conversation continuing until Officer Viens says “sit tight,” which, based 
on the officers’ testimony, would mean the alert necessarily happened before the 
conclusion of the warning.  (Defense Ex. 1, 08:16-11:36; Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25; p. 
73, Ls. 8-18.)  This only affirms Officer Viens’s testimony that he was notified 
about the alert while he was having the disorderly conduct conversation with 
                                            
5 The court’s “hand signal or gesture” finding (R., p. 130) was a reasonable 
inference given the audio.  Neither officer testified whether the officer-to-officer 




Aberasturi.  (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25.)  In sum, the audio does not support 
Aberasturi’s contention that the original investigation was prolonged past the 
point of the alert. 
Because the evidence in the record shows the alert occurred prior to the 
continued detention of Aberasturi, this court should find that the district court 
clearly erred by concluding the detention was unreasonably extended. 
 
B. The District Court Erroneously Required The State Show Probable Cause 
Before Further Detaining Aberasturi, Where It Only Needed Reasonable 
Suspicion 
 
 The state submits on appeal that the district court erroneously applied a 
probable cause standard in examining whether the detention was proper.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.)  Aberasturi responds that the court did not do so, 
arguing that the state’s own quotations show the district court “plainly required 
probable cause for the search,” and not for the seizure.  (Respondent’s brief, p. 
17.) 
 While the district court admittedly referred to requiring “probable cause for 
the search” (R., p. 130), that does not settle the question.  As Aberasturi would 
apparently agree, the decisive question on appeal is not whether there was 
probable cause for the search—but whether the detention was reasonable.6     
 
                                            
6 If the focus was solely on whether probable cause for the search existed, one 
could readily find it: the district court specifically found that at the time the K-9 
alerted “Officer Plaisted had probable cause to believe there were illegal drugs in 
the car.”  (R., p. 128.)  And it is undisputed on appeal that Aberasturi’s consent 
would have allowed for a search of the vehicle.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 17, n. 
6.)  This does not resolve, however, the relevant question of whether reasonable 
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 The district court erred when it concluded “the State failed to meet its 
burden of proof that probable cause to search Defendant’s automobile was 
developed before the purpose of the investigative stop had been fulfilled.”  
(R. p. 130 (emphasis added).)  The state submits that whether probable cause 
developed before the investigative stop concluded is beside the point; the state 
was only required to show that the officers had reasonable suspicion at the time 
the original investigation ended.  State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 
1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).  Because the district court required 
a showing of probable cause “before the purpose of the investigative detention 
had been fulfilled,” it applied an erroneous legal standard. 
 
C. The K-9’s Pre-Alert Behavior Provided Reasonable Suspicion Justifying 
An Extended Detention 
 
Application of the correct legal standard shows the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to further detain Aberasturi even under the facts as found 
by the district court.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)  Thus, even granting the 
district court’s suggestion, and Aberasturi’s explicit argument, that the officer-to-
officer notification referred to the K-9’s “bracketing behavior,” and not the alert, 
the officers would have had reasonable suspicion to further detain Aberasturi.  
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.) 
                                                                                                                                  
suspicion existed at the time of the extended detention.  To the extent the district 
court required anything more than a showing of reasonable suspicion prior to the 
extended detention, it erred. 
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 Aberasturi disagrees on procedural and substantive grounds.  Regarding 
the former, she contends that the state’s argument is unsupported and raised for 
the first time on appeal.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 17-18.)  On the merits, 
Aberasturi claims that the K-9 showing interest in the vehicle would be 
insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion.  (R., pp. 19-20.) 
 Aberasturi’s arguments fail.  As a procedural matter, this issue has been 
preserved because the district court made a ruling that “the State failed to meet 
its burden of proof that probable cause to search Defendant’s automobile was 
developed before the purpose of the investigative stop had been fulfilled.”  (R., p. 
130.)  Thus, the district court plainly made “an adverse ruling which forms the 
basis for an assignment of error.”  State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 
290, 296 (1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 
(1993)); see also State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641, 645 (1998) 
(issues actually decided by trial court are subject to appellate review).  This issue 
was actually decided by the district court, and this Court is not prevented from 
reviewing whether the district court erred when it made its ruling. 
Moreover, in an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to 
suppress, “this Court is not limited by the prosecutor’s argument or the absence 
thereof” below.  State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, No. 42730, 2016 WL 3223372, at *5 
(Ct. App. June 9, 2016), review granted (Sept. 8, 2016) (citing State v. Newman, 
149 Idaho 596, 599, n. 1, 237 P.3d 1222, 1225, n.1 (Ct. App. 2010)).  This Court 
also freely reviews the application of constitutional principles by the district court.  
State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014).  The state’s 
 12 
arguments below would therefore not limit this Court from applying the correct 
legal standard in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify the 
extended stop—a central issue preserved for review. 
Finally, the state did argue below that reasonable suspicion justified the 
detention.  “A police officer may stop and detain a person if the officer has a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
that the person has been or is about to engage in criminal activity.”  (R., p. 106-
07 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 
(1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
1968); State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 829 P.2d 520 (1992); State v. 
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991); and State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 
873, 736 P.2d 1327 (1987)).  The prosecutor also included an entire argument 
regarding how the alert by the drug dog provided legal justification to extend the 
investigative detention.  (R., pp. 111-12.) The record shows that the state did 
preserve the issue of whether the extension of the stop was legally justified. 
 Aberasturi argues that the state raises this issue “for the first time on 
appeal,” narrowly framing the issue as “the proposition that a dog ‘showing 
interest’ in a vehicle establishes reasonable suspicion.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 
18.)  However, the district court made its factual finding relating to this argument 
(which the state believes is clearly erroneous) only after the arguments were 
submitted to it.7  (See R., p. 130 (“Whether [the officer-to-officer notification] 
                                            
7 The state notes that Aberasturi likewise made no argument below regarding the 
significance of the court’s finding regarding the K-9’s pre-alert behavior, for the 
same reason that the finding had not yet been made. Following the hearing 
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occurred as Geno was showing interest in the window or after he sat and refused 
to move is unknown.”).)  Aberasturi has failed to cite to any authority indicating a 
party must accurately anticipate a district court’s factual findings and 
preemptively address them to preserve an issue for appeal.  See State v. Zichko, 
129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered.”)  The state raised the general issue of whether the stop was 
unreasonably extended below, and therefore that issue has been preserved.  
(See R., pp. 111-12.)  Aberasturi’s seeming approach—that parties must not only 
predict specific counterfactual findings but painstakingly rebut them before they 
are made, or forever waive all sub-claims and articulations of issues on appeal—
is unsupported, illogical, and fails. 
Turning to the merits, a continued investigative detention “is permissible if 
it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained 
person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.”  Sheldon, 139 
Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).  Here, Officer Plaisted testified 
that he was a certified K-9 handler and that his K-9 was likewise certified to 
detect the odors of marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine.  (Tr., p. 
63, Ls. 21-24; p. 64, Ls. 2-19.)  The officer testified that “the alert process is 
basically the change of behavior” the K-9 shows, typified by “a lot of head 
                                                                                                                                  
Aberasturi argued that “[t]he officers violated the Fourth Amendment by seizing 
Ms. Aberasturi with no reasonable, articulable suspicion of crime” in the first 
place.  (R., pp. 99-100.)  It does not appear, however, that she ever argued 
below that the officer-to-officer notification pertained to the pre-alert behavior, or 
was inconclusive.  (See R., pp. 63-65, 77-86, 94-102.) 
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snapping, he’ll drool, tail wags. I will see his sniffing increase.”  (Tr., p. 65, Ls. 2-
9.)  When asked whether “that’s when you know he’s alerted to the odor of 
narcotics,” Officer Plaisted first stated that “that’s correct,” and clarified that those 
behaviors showed “[w]hen he is going through the alert process, yes.”  (Tr., p. 
65, Ls. 10-13.)  Moreover, he distinguished these pre-alert process indicators 
from the ultimate alert itself, stating that “Geno’s final response is when we see a 
sit.”  (Tr., p. 65, Ls. 14-18.) 
 Officer Plaisted testified that this very process took place here, prior to the 
actual alert, as the K-9 showed interest in the vehicle: 
Q. And how do you do that? 
 
A. Simply just take him what I would characterize as a walk around 
the car. It’s pretty low key. Then, again, I am just starting to look 
for behavior changes in the dog. 
 
Q. And do you have your dog walk around the car immediately after 




Q. And so when you have your dog walk around the car, what 
happens? What do you observe? 
 
A. So, again, I’m just taking Geno for just a casual walk, is what it 
is. It wasn’t until we got to the passenger’s side of this vehicle 
that that casual walk turned into something more. 
 
I saw Geno do a head snap which is—you know, typically his head 
is kind of down facing forward. And all of a sudden it snaps to the 
left, which draws my attention. And now he’s beginning to sniff the 
odors that are coming out of this car. Geno starts doing what’s 
called a bracketing behavior, which he’s sniffing both left to right. 
 
He approaches I believe it was the front passenger door. I saw that 
the window on the passenger door was rolled down slightly. Geno 
lifts his head up in the air, places his front paws on the door of the 
windowsill itself, and he attempted to stretch his body to get his 
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nose closer to the gap in the window to sniff. And then after he did 
that, he took his paws off the door and then sat down. 
Q. And when he sits down is this—does this indicate something to 
you? 
 
A. Yes. So that—going back, that was—that’s his final response. 
 
(Tr., p. 69, L. 21 – p. 71, L. 8 (emphasis added).)  
Officer Plaisted’s testimony highlights the articulable facts showing a 
reasonable suspicion of drug activity here.  Far from simply showing a dog 
“following its handler’s commands,” as Aberasturi dismisses it (Respondent’s 
brief, p. 19), the testimony showed the K-9’s behavior evolving from 
unremarkable into behavior that typified the alert process.  What began as a 
casual walk “turned into something more,” drawing the officer’s attention—the K-
9 was snapping its head, sniffing at odors, bracketing, and even stretching to the 
window gap to further smell—all of which preceded the final alert, and which 
typified that particular K-9’s pre-alert behavior.  (Tr., p. 69, L. 21 – p. 71, L. 8; 
see also Tr., p. 65, Ls. 2-13.)  Plainly put, the K-9 was showing the same 
physiological responses that the officer testified would precede an alert—and 
while pre-alert interest would not have provided probable cause for a search of 
the vehicle, it at least would have provided reasonable suspicion of drug use, 
such that the officers could have further detained Aberasturi to see if the K-9 
ultimately alerted. 
Aberasturi claims that if this Court finds reasonable suspicion from the K-
9’s pre-alert behavior, and the officer-to-officer notification of it, it would abrogate 
both Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015), and State v. 
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Linze, No. 43960, 2016 WL 6648739 (Nov. 10, 2016).  (Respondent’s brief, p. 
18-19.)  
Not so.  Rodriguez applies to cases in which “unrelated inquiries” extend 
the duration of an otherwise lawful traffic stop, without reasonable suspicion.  
135 S.Ct. at 1615-16.  (“An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated 
checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But … he may not do so in a way 
that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to 
justify detaining an individual.”)  The state’s point in this case is that even if one 
grants that the signal from Officer Plaisted referred only to pre-alert behavior, 
one cannot escape the fact that the pre-alert behavior showing the K-9’s interest 
happened during the original investigation.  (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 18-25  (“Q. Okay. And 
while you’re having this discussion with her about the disorderly conduct 
violation, does Officer Plaisted get your attention? A. Yes.”).)  Thus, Rodriguez 
does not address the state’s argument that the K-9 showing interest in the 
vehicle prior to the end of the stop justified extending it.   
By the same logic, Linze is not implicated here, as it concerns the 
propriety of a K-9 sniff “when the original purpose of the stop is abandoned.”  
2016 WL 6648739, at *3.  In Linze, a traffic stop was impermissibly delayed for 
two and a half minutes while the investigating officer performed a back-up 
function during a drug-dog sweep.  Id. at *4.  Here, the K-9 sniff happened as the 
original investigation unfolded, with no evidence that Officer Viens delayed or 
abandoned that investigation prior to receiving notification from Officer Plaisted.  
(See Tr., pp. 28-44.)  Linze, like Rodriguez, is inapplicable to the issue here. 
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Even if the officer-to-officer notification referred only pre-alert behavior, 
this still would have provided reasonable suspicion to further detain Aberasturi.  
The district court erred when it found insufficient probable cause developed 
before the original investigation concluded; application of the correct, 
reasonable-suspicion standard shows the officers were justified in extending the 




 The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s order 
granting Aberasturi’s suppression motion and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
 DATED this 8th day of February, 2017. 
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